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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

CECIL L. L YN"CH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8022

J. A. HOGLE, doing business as
J. A. HOGLE & C0).1P ANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

f-;TATEI\fENT OF FACTS
A.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this brief plaintiff and appellant will
he referred to

a~

Lynch, and defendant and respondent

a:-; Hogle.
All italics are ours.
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B.

THE FACTS

rrhis appeal ari:-;e:-; out of a complaint by Lynch in
which he alleged that Hogle converted 40 shares of
Ntandard Oil of California stock to his own use, sold the
:-'to<'k and retained the proceeds therefrom. The evidence
eoncerning the stock purchase and sale is undisputed.
It reveals that L~·nch, on the 14th day of ~larch, 1951,
placed an order with the Richard C. Badger & Company,
a ~tock broker, at his place of business in Ogden, Utah.
That thereafter Lynch was informed by Badger's employees that the purchase of stock had been made at a
price of 44-% dollars per share and that the total cost
to him of the stock, plus commission, was $1,793.45.
Lyneh, on the 16th day of :Jiarch, 1951, paid the price in
full hy a cashier's check in the sum of $1,793.45 (R. 12, 13,
79-Exhibits "~\", "B").
The order for 40 shares of stock at 44-o/8 dollars per
share "·as transmitted by Teletype to Hogle.
The purchase of 40 shares of stock of Standard Oil
of California at 44-% dollars per share was actually made
on the New York Stock Exchange by Hogle on March
15, 1951 at 8 :18 a.m. (R. 80). The exact time of the receipt of the order frmn Badger and the purchase in re~ponse thereto are shown by copies of the ticker tape in
the records of the defendant (R. 79, 80). After the purchase on the 15th day of l\iarch, Hogle notified Badger
in Ogden of the purchase of the -10 shares at 44-% dollars
per share (R. 81).
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3
The notice to Badger of the purchase contained a
date on which settlernent for the particular purchase was
to be made. It was sho\vn as the 20th of March, 1951 (R.
~~). On the ~Oth day of l\Iarch payment for the 40 shares
of stock had to be cornpleted in accordance with the HogleBadger interbrokerage arrangen1ent.
In K e'v York Hogle made the purchase through their
odd lot broker and at the close of business on the 15th
there wa~ actually held by Hogle the 40 shares thus purchased, together with 13 other shares which were purchased for other customers. They had in their receipts
for the day two certificates, one for 50 shares and one for
3 shares (R. 82-84).
The nonnal procedure after such a purchase, was
for the broker, fr01n whon1 the order was received,
to give instructions for the delivery and transfer of the
certificate to the purchaser (R. 85). Badger gave no such
instructions. The stock thus purchased remained in his
account until the 2-!th day of l\{arch, 1951, on which day
Badger ordered Hogle to sell 50 shares of stock of Standard Oil of California (R. 126). 50 shares were sold for
46-lj8 dollars per share on l\Iarch 24th at 8:38 a.m. The
settlement date on this sale was the 28th day of l\Iarch,
1951 (R. 127). No settlement was ever made. Badger
died on the 27th day of .March, 1951 (R. 40).
Lynch never authorized Badger to sell the 40 shares
of stock purchased on his account nor did he authorize
Hogle to ~ell (R.lS).
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A l'ter the death of Badger, Hogle sold the 25 shares
of Standard Oil of California stock which remained in
the Badger Omnibus Account and received therefrom
+S-~8 dollars per share (R. Ha). As was customary,
when Badger purchased stock the purchase was made in
hi~ own name and likewise when Hogle purchased stock
for Badger the stock was purchased in the name of Hogle
(R. 158-160). None of the proceeds from the sale of the
~toek which had been purchased on Badger's order by
Hogle was ever paid over to Lynch.

I

On the settlement date, i.e., the 20th day of }larch,
1 ~)31, Hogle received from Badger a check in the sum of
$40,000. The check was drawn against the First Security
Bank of Ogden, r tah, and was used in the settling of
outstanding balances between Hogle and Badger (R.
103).
It appears throughout the testimony of l\ir. Max
Xiemoth, an employee of defendant, that there was handled in Hogle's accounts an open account with the Badger brokerage which was known as the "Omnibus Account." In the Omnibus Account was placed all stocks
purchased by Badger for his customers, and into and
out of the account Badger deposited or withdrew funds
from time to time, the only requirement by Hogle being
that there be in his custody sufficient assets belonging to Badger to give a 25% margin on the purchases
through the Omnibus Account and a 75% margin on purchases made for Badger personally (R. 104).
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The cashier'::; check, which Lynch gave for the price
of hi::; ::;tock. wa::; deposited by Badger in the First Security Bank of Ogden, Utah, on the 16th day of :March,
1951 (R. ±3). Out of that account the checks paying to
Hogle the various large sun1s of n1oney were drawn.
~-\fter the death of Badger it was discovered that there
·was an overdraft in the First Security Bank of Ogden
of something in excess of $9,000.00.
The record shmvs "·ithout dispute that for some time
prior to the 15th day of 1\Iarch, 1951 and up until his
death, Badger and Hogle cooperated one with the other
to give to Badger current funds which he used in a kiting
transaction. The actual mechanics were as follows:
Badger ·would present to Hogle a check on the First Security Bank of Ogden, Utah. These checks were very
large in amounts, being in the sums of forty, thirty-two,
thirty-nine and twenty thousand dollars. For this personal check Hogle issued his check on the Walker Bank
& Trust Company. Sometimes the check was in the identical amount which Badger deposited. On other occasions
there was a net payment by Badger to Hogle. Badger,
after receiving the Hogle check on occasions obtained
from Walker Bank & Trust Company a Federal Reserve
draft. On other occasions Badger took the Hogle check
and deposited it in his Salt Lake Bank account at the
First National Bank. Then Badger drew a check on the
First National Bank and deposited it in his First Security Bank account at Ogden, Utah in order to meet the
check given to Hogle. In this way Badger obtained a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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two <lay eredit on the amounts of the check which he
otherwi~e

could not have obtained through the usual

banking <·hannels. After Badger's death a check in the
~um

of $34,000.00, datPd March 24, 1951, and which was

in the kiting eyele, was presented to the First Security
Hank of Ogden, Utah and was returned marked "Maker
Deceased" and "Insufficient Funds" (R. 132, 142). Hogle
knew of the Badger account at the First National Bank
in Salt Lake, and knew that the only legal benefit which
could be obtained by Badger through their check cashing
service \\'as a two day float (R. 155). In other words, for
two days Badger would have the use of the money shown
on the face of his check without paying interest or service
charges. The checks were not drawn against any balance
in the Omnibus Account, but were exchanged simply as
an accommodation for the personal check of Badger which
was presented prior to the Hogle check being issued (R.
156).
~-\.t

all tin1es 1naterial to Lynch's cause of action there

was on deposit with defendant an excess over the marginal requirements of the U. S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, so that if Badger had desired to so do without the payment of additional funds he could have obtained for L~Tnch the 40 shares of Standard Oil of California
stock which he had paid for and which was due him (R.
157, 158).
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It is only after the death of Badger, the insufficient
funds check and other unrelated charges are deducted
that the Badger balance at Hogles fall below the marginal
require1nent of the S.E.C.

At the close of Lynch's evidence Hogle moved the
court for a disn1issal of Lynch's complaint, which motion
was granted. However, the court made Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and a Decree based on the evidence
"·hich had been presented at the close of Lynch's case.
In the findings the court found generally concerning the
type of business Badger and Hogle were engaged in; concerning their relationship; and also findings on the Federal Reserve Board Rules and Regulations and the Omnibus Account and marginal requirements. The court then
found in paragraph 6 of the findings that Lynch was a
customer of Badger and had authorized Badger to purchase 40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock on the
14th day of :J[arch, 1951; that upon receiving the order
Badger sent a Teletype message to Hogle and ordered
40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock. The court
further found that Hogle purchased on the New York
Stock Exchange 40 shares of stock of Standard Oil of
California for the account of Badger and credited hin1
"·ith the 40 shares which were so purchased.
In paragraph 8 the court found that Lynch paid
Richard C. Badger for the -1:0 shares of Standard Oil of
California stock which had been ordered through his
brokerage. The court then found that there was no cerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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t i l'i<'atP of ~to<'k ever issued in the name of Badger nor in

the name of Lynch nor was there any identifiable certifi('a te of stock for 40 shares which Lynch could identify.
rl'he findings also contain a finding that Badger had sold
~P(·urities in excess of $600,000.00 which belonged to his
customers and had in effect misappropriated securities of
his customers before :March 27, 1951.
Finding 11 is to the effect that the relationship between Hogle and Badger was one of broker to broker.
Finding 12 was to the effect that Hogle had no knowledge of Badger's financial difficulties.
The court also found that Hogle and Lynch had
both filed claims with the Estate of Richard C. Badger
and that the claims had been allowed, Lynch's claim in
the sum which he had paid to Badger; Hogle's claim in
the su1n of $170,000.00, and that the 25 shares of stock
remaining in the custody of Hogle, which had been purchased on the order of Badger, were sold pursuant to
court order.
There is also a finding that the net loss, if any, to
Hogle, as result of the Badger account, cannot be determined until an ultimate liquidation of all securities which
are held by Hogle and that at this time no finding can be
made as to the loss, if any, that Hogle may suffer.
The Conclusions of Law were as follows: That there
was no privity of contract between Lynch and Hogle and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that Hogle i~ not responsible legally or equitably for the
loss sustained by Lynch; that Lynch is entitled to take
nothing by his con1plaint and the ~arne should be disnlissed on its merits.
The Decree n1erely dismissed Lynch's complaint on
its merits.
Lynch 1noved the court to amend and modify the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree and
said motion was duly heard and portions of the motion
granted.
The mnendments, which the court allowed, made a
finding that the -10 shares of Standard Oil of California
stock, which were purchased by Hogle on Badger's order,
were in fact purchased pursuant to the order which
Lynch had placed with Badger. The court also amended
the findings to find in detail the transactions which occurred at the time of the purchase and sale of the Standard Oil of California stock which was purchased by Hogle
on order of Badger and sold on his order.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS THE OWNER OF 40 SHARES OF
STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA STOCK AFTER ITS PURCHASE ON MARCH 15, 1951.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT CONVERTED PLAINTIFF'S STOCK BY
SALE WITHOUT AUTHORITY.
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POINT III.

I

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF HIS STOCK.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS THE OWNER OF 40 SHARES OF
STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA STOCK AFTER ITS PURCHASE ON MARCH 15, 1951.

The law is clear and unequivocal that stocks pur<·ha:-:t><l hy a broker for hi;.; client are the property of the
client and title thereto immediately vests in the purchasing client.

Richardson v. ""'lwu·, 209 r.s. 363, 52 L. Ed.
s:35, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512;
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874,
28 Atl. 106;
Tuckerman v. Mearns, 49 App. D. C. 153, 262
Fed. 607;
Little v. JJ cClain, 134 App. Div. 197, 118 N.
Y. Supp. 916;
Barbour v. Sproul, 239 Pa. 171, 86
Content v: Banner, 184
913;

~.

~\tl.

714;

Y. 121, 76 N. E.

ill arkham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235.

The principle of law cited is applied most frequently
in cases where the customer purchased stock and owed
a portion of the purchase price to the broker. Where
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the purcha~e i~ one for cash or the price is paid in full,
the rule that the title and property to the stock vests
i1nmediately in the client is applied more strictly than in
the marginal purcha~e ca~e~. Such is the rule set forth in
Gorman r. Littlefield, :2:2~) lT. S. 19, 33 S. Ct. 690, 691. In
the Gorman case, as in the case at bar, the clain1ant could
not identify by certificate number the particular certificate for 100 share~ which had been purchased on his order.
The court discussed the customary practice of purchasing
stock for custmners and taking the certificat~ in the nan1e
of the broker, the transfer to the nan1e of the customer
occurring at the time the stock is delivered. The Supreme Court then recites as the law governing this situation the following:
"In the subsequent case of Sexton v. Kessler
r. S. 90, 56 L. ed. 995, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
657, this court, speaking of the relation of custon1er and broker, said (p. 97):
& Co., :2:25

"''Yhen a broker agrees to carry stock for a
custon1er, he may buy stock to fill several orders
in a lump; he may increase his single purchase by
stock of the san1e kind that he wants for himself;
he may pledge the whole block thus purchased for
what sum he likes, or deliver it all in satisfaction
of later orders, and he may satisfy the earlier
eustmner with any stock that he has on hand or
that he buys when the time for delivery comes.
Yet, as he is bound to keep stock enough to satisfy
his contracts, as the New York firm in this case
was bound to substitute other security if it withdrew an~·, the customer is held to have such an interest that a delivery to him by an insolvent broker
is not a preference. Richardson v. Shaw, supra;
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
~r arkham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235. So, a depositor
in a grain elevator may have a property in grain
in a certain elevator, although the keeper is at
liberty to mix his own or other grain with the
(lqwsit, and empty and refill the receptacle
twent ~, times before making good his receipt to
the depositor concerned.'

"It is therefore unnecessary for a customer,
where shares of stock of the same kind are in the
hands of a broker, being held to satisfy his claims,
to he able to put his finger upon the identical certificates of stock purchased for him. It is enough
that the broker has shares of the same kind which
are legally subject to the demand of the customer. And in this respect the trustee in bankruptcy
is in the same position as the broker. Richardson
v. Shaw, supra."
The conclusion in the Gorman case was as follows:
"It is said, however, that the shares in this
particular case are not so identified as to come
within the rule. But it does appear that at the
time of bankruptcy certificates were found in the
bankrupt's possession in an amount greater than
those which should have been on hand for this
customer, and the significant fact is shown that no
other customer claimed any right in those shares
of stock. It was, as we have seen, the duty of the
broker, if he sold the shares specifically purchased
for the appellant, to buy others of like kind, and
to keep on hand subject to the order of the customer certificates sufficient for the legitimate demands upon him. If he did this, the identification
of particular certificates is unimportant. Furthermore, it was the right and duty of the broker, if
he sold the certificates, to use his own funds to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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keep the anwunt good, and this he could do without depleting hi:S estate to the detri1nent of other
creditors who had no propery rights in the certificates held for particular customers. No creditor could ju:Stly de1nand that the estate be augInented by a wrongful conversion of the property
of another in this n1anner, or the application to
the general estate of property which never rightfully belonged to the bankrupt."
In Hedges r. Burke} 147 Tenn. 247, 247 S.W. 91, it
was held on the facts of our case that title to the stock,
which had been purchased by a corresponding broker for
the broker who dealt directly with an individual client,
vested in the client from the moment the stock was paid
for by the client or the moment that it was purchased by
the corresponding brokers.
Wahl'//. Tra.cy} 139 Wis. 668, 121 N. W. 660, similarly
held that cash purchases of stock vested in the customer
the title to the stock in the broker's hands from the time
of the stock purchase.

In Tuckerman 'IJ·. Mearns} 49 App. D. C. 153, 262 Fed.
607, it was held that the legal title to the stock purchased
on credit advanced by the broker vested in the customer
immediately upon the purchase.
Massachusetts is one of the few jurisdictions which
holds that the broker retains title to stock purchased on
margin and that there is only a debtor-creditor relationship existing between the broker and the customer. However, in Gifford L Eastman, 251 Mass. 540, 146 N. E.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it \\'as held that where stock is purchased and the
price paid in full the stock became the property of the
customer and the broker was merely an agent. See also
Brou-n , .. Nuslilon, ~~:~~Tass. RO, 111 N. E. s.~-t-.

I

17:~,

Sterlin_r;'s Estate, 25-t- Pa. 1;)5, 98 Atl. 771 is another
instance of the broker purchasing on credit for his customer and the court holds that the title to the stock thus
purchased vested in the customer and not the broker.
For a similar holding see Content 1:. Banner, 184 N. Y.
1:21, 76 N. E. 913.
In La IIIJJrecht v. Sta.te, 84 Ohio St. 3:2, 95 N. E. 656,
the rule of Richardson v. Shaw was applied by the Ohio
courts and adopted as the law of Ohio. ·
Sack~·ille r.

Wimer, 76 Colo. 519, 233 Pac. 152, does
not apply the vesting of title principle, but sets forth the
law of many other jurisdictions which have applied that
principle. The case is annotated at 41 A.L.R. 1258. The
annotation discusses all of the cases cited herein and
demonstrates beyond refutation that as a legal principle
there is little, if any, dissent from the Richardson doctrine that the title to stock purchased through a broker
vests in the customer upon the fulfilling of the customer's
order.
The forms which Badger and Hogle used illustrate
clearly the relationship that exists between the broker
and a customer ordering stocks. Exhibit "C", which is the
notice to Lynch of the purchase by Badger, states on its
face the following:
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.. "Te haYe this day BOUGHT for your aeconnt and ri~k on the N.Y.S.E."
~-\.ll

of the incident~ of ownership immediately follo\ved the purchase by Badger for Lynch. Plaintiff was
entitled to all dividends fron1 the date of purchase and all
other rights which flowed from the purchase of the stock.
On the Hogle invoice to Badger, showing the purchase of
the -!0 shares of Standard Oil of California stock, Hogle
again included the phrase which indicates clearly that
Badger \Yas the owner of the stock. Hogle's language
is as follows (Exhibit "L") :
"I'"nless otherwise indicated, we as brokers,
have this day 1nade the following transaction for
your account and risk."
Badger was a stock broker. The purchase by Hogle
\\·as made through Badger's Omnibus Account. :Mr. Niemoth, an einployee of years of experience with Hogle~
stated without contradiction and without cross-examination that he knew that the purchases made through the
Omnibus Account by Badger were purchases made for
customers of Badger and not for Badger's personal account. If Badger made a personal purchase through the
Omnibus Account he would be violating S.E.C. regulations because on purchases on his personal account he
had to supply a margin of 75%, while on purchases
for his custmners he was entitled to a margin of 25o/c.
The leading authority concerning the relationship
existing between stock brokers and their customers is
H icha.rdsou 1'. Slzmr, 209 F.S. 365, 52 L. Ed. 835, 28 S. Ct.
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:->12, :-> 1:->. In the Ri,cha.rdson case there was before the
lTnited :-·Hates Supreme Court a bankrupt stock broker
alHl a ('nstomer ('!aiming certificates of stock which had
been pnn·hased through the bankrupt. The court examined carefully the facts and reviewed all the law then
existing on the relationship of stock broker and customer.
The court stated the relationship existing, in the following language:

"At the inception of the contract it is the customer who wishes to purchase stocks, and he procures the broker to buy on his account. As was
said hy Jlr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the
court in Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193-198, 3:2
L. ed. 6:>~, 659, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335, a broker is
but an agent, and is bound to follow the directions
of his principal, or give notice that he declines the
agency.
''The dividends on the securities belong to the
customer. The customer pays interest upon the
purchase price, and is credited with interest upon
the margins deposited. He has the right at any
time to withdraw his excess over 10 per cent deposited as margin with the broker. Upon settlement of the account he receives the securities. In
this case the broker assumed to pledge the stocks,
not because he was the owner thereof, but because,
by the terms of the contract, printed upon every
statement of account, he obtained the right from
the customer to pledge the securities upon general
loans, and in like manner he secured the privilege
of selling when necessary for his protection.
"The risk of the venture is entirely upon the
customer. He profits if it succeeds; he loses if it
fails. The broker gets out of the transaction, when
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clost'd in accordance with the understanding of
the partie~. his connni:;;sion and interest upon the
adYnncl'~. and nothing ebe. That such was the
arrangernent between the parties is shown in the
te::;tinwny of the broker's agent, who testified: 'If
these stocks carried for J. :t\I. Shaw & Company
rnade a profit, that profit belongs to Shaw & Company over and above what he owed us.'
"\Vhen Young, the agent of Shaw & Con1pany,
dernanded the stocks, their right of ownership in
thern was recognized, and, while pledged, they
\\-ere under the control of the broker, were
prmnptly redeerned, and turned over to the custorner. Consistently with the tenns of the contract,
as understood by both parties, the broker could
not have declined to thus redeern and turn over
the stock, and, when adjudicated a bankrupt, his
trustee had no better rights, in the absence of
fraud or preferential transfer, than the bankrupt
himself. Security \Y arehousing Co. v. Hand, 206
U.S. -!15, -:1-:23, fl1 L. ed. 1117, 1122, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.
7:20; Thomr..,on v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 526,
-±9 L. ed. 57/, 586, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306; Hurnphrey
v. Tabnan, 198 U. S. 91, 49 L. ed. 956, 25 Sup. Ct.
Rep. :S67; York ~Ifg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 34-!,
:1;3:2, :)0 L. ed. 782, 7S:S, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. -!81.
"It is objected to this view of the relation of
custorner and broker that the broker was not
obliged to return the very stocks pledged, but
nright substitute other certificates for those re-.
ceived by him, and that this is inconsistent with
ownernship on the part of the customer, and
shows a proprietary interest of the broker in the
shares; but this contention loses sight of the fact'
that the certificate of shares of stock is not the
property itself, it is but the evidence of property
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in the ~lwn·~. The <·Prtificate, as the term implies,
hut <·Prtifi<'~ tlH· ownership of the property and
righb in the corporation rPpresented hy the number of shares named.
"A <·Prtificate of the same number of shares,
although printed upon different paper and bearing a different number, represents precisely the
same kind and value of property as does another
certificate for a like number of shares of stock in
the same corporation. It is a misconception of the
nature of the certificate to say that a return of a
different certificate or the right to substitute one
certificate for another is a material change in the
property right held by the broker for the customer. Horton Y. :\forgan, 19 K. Y. 170, 75 Am. Dee.
311; Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 218, 21 L.R.A. 102, 26 Atl. 874,
2~ A tl. 10-±. A~ was said by the court of appeals
of K ew York in Caswell Y. Putnam, 120 N.Y. 153,
1;)7, 24 X. E. 287, 'one share of stock is not different in kind or value frmn every other share of the
same issue and company. They are unlike distinct
articles of personal property which differ in kind
and value, such as a horse, wagon, or harness.
The stock has no earmark which distinguishes
one share frmn another, so as to give it any additional value or importance; like grain of a uniform quality, one bushel is of the same kind and
value as another.'"
Ever since the Richardson decision was announced
it has been recognized by all courts as the binding authority concerning relationship of stock broker and customer. A fairly recent case citing Richa.rdson v. Shmr,
.and other authorities is Blankenhorn~Hunter-Dulin Co.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

i

19
r. Thayer, 1D9 l ~al. 90, :2-l-7 Pac. lOSS. The California

court ~et~ forth its understanding of the Richardson decision in the following language:
"~eYeral propositions seem to be well settled:
(1) That, as between a broker and a customer who
has paid for stock in full, the latter is the owner
of the stock, and does not impliedly authorize the
broker to pledge the security. ~-\.s to the fully paid
customer, the pledging of his stock by the broker
is "·rongful * * * ."

Concerning plaintiff's ownership, it will be observed
by the court that the plaintiff's payn1ent to Badger for
the ~tock purchased for hin1 was deposited by Badger in
the First Security Bank of Ogden on the 16th day of
~larch, 1951. Fron1 the First Security Bank of Ogden account Badger withdrew the following sums on the following dates (Exhibits .. J" and"!{:"):
$:25,000__________________________________________________ :l\Iarch 16, 1951
:25,000 __________________________________________________ ~larch 19, 1951
-l-O,OOO __________________________________________________ .J[arch 20, 1951
These checks were checks nu1nbered 17002, 17702 and
1770-l-. The~· were paid to Hogle~ Xieuwth, Fiogte's witness, stated that the settlement date \vas a date on which
there must be settlement for purchases Inade with said
settlement date. It will also be observed by the court that
the following checks were paid by Hogle on the dates
\\-hich Hogle received the Badger checks listed above:
$33,-l-OO.OO ______________________________________________ ~Iarch
JO,OOO.OO ______________________________________________ ~[arch
3S,OOO.OO ______________________________________________ ~larch
:2,000.00______________________________________________ .Jlarch

16,
19,
20,
:20,

1951
1951
1951
1951
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The checks enumerated above show without possihility of <·ontradietion that the money which was received
l>~· HadgPr from plaintiff was paid to defendant. The
ehecks f'urth<'r prove \Yi thout possibility of contradiction
that dPf'endant had been paid for the stock which wa;-;
ordered by Badger on behalf of Lynch.
It is plaintiff'~ position, which he feels is supported
all of the evidence and is uncontradicted by any evidence, that on the 20th of ~r arch, 1951 Badger settled
with defendant for the purchase of the 40 shares of
Standard Oil of California stock, which was purchased
on Lynch's order.
1>~·

It appears frmn the clear legal principles applicable
and from the facts presented to the trial court that Lynch

I

was the mvner of the stock purchased on his order when
that order \Yas filled and that he had paid in full not
only to Badger, but to Hogle for the stock purchased
on his account.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT CONVERTED PLAINTIFF'S STOCK BY
SALE WITHOUT AUTHORITY.

Plaintiff owned 40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock which had been purchased by Badger
through Hogle. This proposition seems to be clear and
without serious doubt from the cases cited in the preceding point. Once having established his ownership Lynch
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submits that the eyidence is uncontradicted that Hogle
eonverted the ~tock which he owned, and is in possession
of the proceeds frmn said conversion.
In Richardson r. Slwzc. supra, there was no equivocation on the proposition that the broker who deals with
his customers stock in other than an authorized manner
is engaged in wrongful conduct. A great number of the
cases concern the1nselves w·ith the question of the broker's
authority where the custmner has authorized the use of
the 5 tock in the obtaining of credit by the broker, or in
the language of the stock exchange, has purchased his
~tock on 1nargin. ~Iarginal speculators are in a very
different category from purchasers of stock who pay
the full price in cash.
Lynch's testimony that he gave no authority to sell
the Standard Oil of California stock which had been purchased on his account by Badger, is uncontroverted and
undisputed. There is no contention that Badger nor anyone else had authority to sell, pledge or in any way
handle the stock purchased for Lynch except to order its
transfer and delivery to him.
A great number of cases have dealt with the legal
effects of sale or pledge by brokers who have no authority
from their customer. One of the landmark cases is In re
T. A. JJ!clntyre & Co., 181 Fed. 955, 958. The Circuit
Court of Appeals there dealt with one custmner of the
~fcintyre brokerage, and the discussion is under the
heading of ''Appeal of Pippey." Pippey had deposited
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l\1(' [ntyre brokerage 18 shares of Pullman Com-

I

pan~'

<·oumwn stock. :M<·Intyre pledged Pippey's certifi('H1<' without his authorit~'· l\Icintyre then became bankrupt and the question arose as to whether or not Pippey
was entitled to the return of his certificate, which was in
the hands of the pledgee of the ~Ieintyre company. The
Circuit Court held that the pledge of Pippey's stock without authority "'as a lareeny of his stock. Their language
is unequivocal and clearly sets forth the principles which
are applicable in the present case.

"* * * The firm had no right to pledge them
for any of its own debts. vVhen "it did pledge them
to the trust company, the day before its failure,
the firm had no transaction pending and was
itself indebted to Pippey. This was a larceny of
his stock. Tompkins v. :Morton Trust Co., 91 App.
Div. 21 -+, SG N". Y. Supp. 520; Kavanaugh v. 1\IcInt:Te, l:Zs App. Div. 722, 112 N. Y. Supp. 987.
X o one disputes that proposition. By reason of
the circumstances that when he left the certificate
with the brokers it was duly indorsed with a transfer in blank executed hy himself, he exposed himself to risk of losing his stock if the person to
whom it was pledged, in good faith, for a valuable
consideration, found it necessary to sell it in order
to secure payment of his advances. That would
be solely because Pippey would be estopped from
asserting his title against the person who had
parted with value on the faith of the transfer he
had signed. But the pledgee has not found it necessary to sell the Pulhnan stock. It has repaid itself from other items of the pledged property.
It no longer has any lien on such property. It can
no longer avail of any doctrine of estoppel. PipSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pey·~

title to his ~tock is absolute. I Ie is entitled
to the certificate which represents that title. The
trustee~. in the language of the United States Supreine Court, 'have no better right in (it) than the
bankrupt.' Thomas Y. Taggart, 209 IT. S. 385, 28
~up. Ct. 319, 3:2 L. Ed. ~-+5."

There is one distinction between the facts in the
Pippey case and the facts in plaintiff's appeal. Pippey's
stock was identified by certificate number. This fact is
innnaterial and so held in Gorman r. Littlefi.eld, supra.
However, there is an additional authority which is UTIdistinguishable frmn plaintiff's appeal on the question of
identical certificates or identifiable certificates.
In re Brou·n et al., 185 Fed. 766, concerned the bankruptcy of a brokerage concern doing business under the
name of A. 0. Brown & Co. One of the appeals \vhich the
Circuit Court discussed was by Helen ni. Wilkin. Wilkin
had ordered fron1 Brown & Co., 10 shares of American
Locomotive Cmnpany stock. She was informed on the
day of her order that the stock had been bought frmn
Carlisle, nfellick & Co., firm of brokers doing business
on the floor of the X ew York Stock Exchange. vVilkin
and A. 0. Brown & Co., consummated their transaction
at Utica, Xew York After "\Vilkin received notice of the
purchase she gave her check for $583.73 to Brown & Co.,
in full pa:nnent for the purchase of the 10 shares of stock.
Her check was deposited in the account of Brown & Co.,
and paid in due course. Wilkin never received her stock
certificate. On the day she placed her order with Brown
& Co., it bought through Carlisle, :Mellick & Co., on the
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floor of til<' New York Stock Exchange 10 shares of
A lll<'rican Locomotive Company stock. On the same
dn~· Brown & Co., ordered Carlisle, Mellick & Co., to sell
lO ~hare~ of American Locomotive Company stock, and
~ix da:·~ later Carlisle, Mellick & Co., settled with Brown
& Co., on the two transactions. The trustee In re Brown
took the position taken in Lynch's appeal by Hogle. The
trustee claimed that no stock was ever purchased for l\1:rs.
"'\Vilkin and therefore that she was entitled to the purchase price paid hy her out of the funds received from the

F tica City 1\ a tional Bank. The court held that was not
so. It followed through the purchase by Carlisle, Mellick
& Co., and the sale of an identical number of shares of

the same stock by Carlisle, :\Iellick & Co. It then found
that A. 0. Brown & Co., not having given the stock to
Wilkin and not having it in their possession at the date
of their bankruptcy n1ust be regarded as having converted it.
Plaintiff's evidence in the present case is much
stronger than the evidence of \rilkin in the Brou·n case.
There is no dispute but what an actual delivery of 40
shares of Standard Oil of California stock was made to
Hogle. There is no dispute that between the 15th day of
1\Iarch, 1951 and the 24th day of March, 1951, Hogle held
in its Omnibus Account for Badger 75 shares of Standard Oil of California stock. 40 of those shares were the
property of Lynch. When they were sold Badger and
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Hogle converted plaintiff's property and the proceed~
frOin that conYPrsion, the evidence shows without dispute, re~nain in the hands of Hogle.
There are a ntuuber of brokerage bankruptcy cases
"~hich discuss inconceivably complicated situations which
occur where brokers have dealt fraudulently and illegally
with the nwneys and property of their clients. These
cases all adhere to the principles which are set forth in
Pippey's appeal and In re Brou·1z. The cases are enlightening but not specifically in point. As illustrations, see
In re ~llason et al. Kier v. Steer, :2S:2 Fed. 202; In re J. F.
Pierson, Jr., & Co., :2:25 Fed. 889; In re J. C. Wilson &
Co., :23:2 Fed. 631; In re Brown et al., 175 Fed. 769; In re
Ennis et al., 187 Fed. 720.
Concerning the general proposition of whether or not
Hogle, because of his complicity in the conversion of
Lynch's 40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock
can be held as a converter, the law seen1s to be relatively
clear and \vithout serious dispute. Early in our legal
history this court in Bowe v. Palmer et al., 36 Utah 21-1,
102 Pac. 1007, held that an agent acting for and on behalf
of his 1naster could personally be held responsible for
the conversion of a tenants property.
In the jurisdictions surrounding l7tah a nu1nber of
cases have held that persons benefiting by the conversion
are liable for said wrongful appropriation of the property...\~ exmnples see Hardie v. Peterson et al., 86 1\font.
I:lO, :2S:2 Pac. 49-1; Bruton v. Sakariason, 21 N. ~I. 438,
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155 I>ae. 725; CarzJenter et al. ?;. Scott et al., 109 Okla. 207,
I >ae. 1()~; George W. Brown & Sons State Bank of
J>ofen e/ ol., 1:~~ Okla. 1~1, 2/0 Pac. 9; Durin L Dou·liny
ct al., 14G Wa;-;lJ. 137, 262 Pac. 123; Cone r. !vinson, 4
\r yo. 203, :1:> Pac. 933.

2:~:>

It would seem to be clear beyond possible dispute
that it is not ne(·essary that a contractual relationship
exist before a conversion can be claimed by the owner of
property. For such a holding, however, see Coats & Williamson, Inc.,

1:.

Moran & Co., et al., 67 Cal. App. 46, 227

Pac. 213.
The American Law Institute Restatement of the
Lmr of Torts, Yol. 1, p. 595, Sec. 233, states as follows:
··Sec. 233. Conversion by Disposition by Agent or
Servant as Against One Other Than Bailor.
"(1) Except as stated in Subsection (4), one
who as agent or servant of a third person disposes
of a chattel to one not entitled to its immediate
possession in consun1n1ation of a transaction negotiated by the agent or servant is liable for a conversion to another who, as against his principal
or n1aster, is entitled to the immediate possession
of the chattel."

As an example, the editors of the Restatement cite
the following illustration:
"2. A employs B, his broker, to sell certain
bonds payable to order. B sells the bonds to C and
delivers then1 pursuant to the sale. Both B and C
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nrL' ignorant of the fact that ~\ had stolen the
and forged the nmne of D, the last endorsee.
B is liable to D."
bond~

From the authorities cited and frmn the application
of logic it would seen1 clear that Hogle converted the 40
shares of stock.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE PROCEEDS FRO~I THE SALE OF HIS STOCK.

Plain tiff is en ti tied to be paid the proceeds fron1 the
:::ale of his stock and any other disposition of said fund
would be an unjust enrichment of Hogle at the expense
of Lynch. Throughout the cases which are cited in the
preceding two points the bone of contention giving rise
to the litigation has been who is entitled to preference in
the funds found in the hands of bankrupt brokers. The
rules which have been recited have been formulated by
courts bent on doing justice between contending creditors. The general creditors are always prevented from
benefiting frmn the security of creditors who have preference.
Gorman r. Littlefield, supra, and Richardson v .

.~'haze, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
~tates, and the Circuit Court cases which have been cited,
all hold that as between a customer whose stock has been
converted by the broker and a customer whose stock has
been rightfully used by the broker, the owner of the .conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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verted 1-~toek i1-1 entitled to a priority, and must be paid
in full hefon· any of the assets of the broker can be used
to benefit the general creditors or customers whose stock
has been rightfull)· appropriated by the broker. A sumtnary of the pn•c·eding (·a;.;e1-1 decided by the United States
Supreme Court was made by Justice :McReynolds in
D1tel v. Hollins et al., 2-1-1 r. S. 523, 36 S. Ct. 615, 616.
In his opinion he succinct!)· set;.; forth the principle in
the following language:
••*'' * * K o creditor eould justly demand that
the estate be augmented b)· a wrongful conversion
of the property of another in this Inanner, or the
application to the general estate of property which
neYer rightfully belonged to the bankrupt."

In re Brou·n et al., 175 Fed. 769, 770, a case arising
out of the A. 0. Brown and Co., bankruptcy. The customer of the brokerage there had furnished to the brokers
money for the purchase of stock. The stock had been
bought and paid for by the brokers and afterwards converted to their own use. The Circuit Court of the Second
Circuit in ruling that the customer could not rescind the
contract between himself and the broker and follow his
original purchase money as a trust fund sets forth the
rights and remedies of the customer in the following language:
"\Vhile \Ye approve the ulti1nate result reached
by the District Judge, we think the ruling that
the claimant had the right to rescind the whole
transaction upon the conversion of its shares and
follow the purchase price erroneous. The right to
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re;::;eind a contraet and recover that which has been
parted with under it does not exist in a case like
the present. That specific right is available only
in cases of fraud, undue influence, or duress.
·· 'Vhen the brokers, after purchasing the
;::;hares ordered and paid for by the claimant,
\\Tongfully converted them, the claimant had an
election of rernedies :
.. (1) It rnight have brought an action of tort
for the conversion .
.. (:2) It rnight have waived the tort and sued
for the proceeds of the shares-if in money-and
also have followed such proceeds as a trust fund
in the hands of the brokers or their bankrupt
estate.
•· (3) Asstuning that it was the obligation of
the brokers under their contract, not only to purchase the shares, but to deliver them, the claimant
had the right to treat the conversion as a breach
of contract and sue for damages .

.. ( -!) Sirnilarly, it had the right to treat the
conversion as a discharge of the contract and sue
in assumpsit upon the implied contract to refund
the money paid.

"But in the last case - as in the others the right of action originated when the conversion
took place. Then for the first tirne there was an
implied contract to repay the moneys advanced
to purchase the shares. Nothing which had taken
place was annulled. The claimant's moneys had
been expended precisely in accordance with its
directions. Any trust attaching thereto had been
fulfilled. There was no money in the brokers'
hands clothed with a trust after the stocks ordered
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had IJ<·<·n hought and paid for. And if there were
an~·

such money after the conversion, it was the

I>roePP<h: of the ~lwres, and not the purchase price

thereof."
It is Lynch's position that the Circuit Court's opin-

ion is sound in all re.-;pechl, that he should be allowed to
follow the proceeds from his converted stock into the
hands of Hogle. It will be recalled by the court that the
settlement date for the payment of the proceeds of the
sale of the 50 shares of Standard Oil of California stock
ordered sold by Badger on the 24th day of March was the
28th of

~larch

and that Badger died on the 27th of March.

1,,
I

No settlement "·a8 eyer 1nade. The court will also recall
that the proceeds from the 25 shares of Standard Oil of
California stock

i~

likewise still in the hands of defend-

ant. As far as tracing the proceeds from the sale of plaintiff's stock, those proceeds have not been paid out or left
the hands of Hogle.
Taking a different tact the court will be well aware
of the fact that there i~ in possession of Hogle funds in

ilit

excess of any secured demand which they could make
against the Badger estate. The accountants' report, introduced by defendant and marked Exhibit "G", contains
at page 23 the following statement:
"Included in the above total is a check in
amount of $34,000.00 payable to J. A. Hogle & Co.
On reference to that firm's accounts on Exhibit
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.. ~-\'',it will be noted that it holds collateral valued
in exeess of the liability owing-, which liability as
stated has been reduced bY the anwunt of this
$3±,000.00 check: the question seems to logically
a rise as to whether or not the collateral pledged
will also secure this outstanding check."
Interpreting the quote in the light of the evidence
it appears that Hogle cashed a check which was returned
for insufficient funds. Exa1nining the accounting made
by :Jir. :Jiaw and by the Certified Public Accountants,

\Yells, Baxter & :Jiiller, it appears that for the $34,000.00
pa~-ment

n1ade to Badger

h~-

Hogle, Hogle received only

a check from Badger in a like sun1 of $34,000.00. This
check was issued on the 26th of :March, 1951 and returned
to Hogle marked "Insufficient Funds" and
ceased."

~\s

··~raker

De-

to the $34,000.00 clai1n it is Lynch's position

that Hogle is in no better position than a general creditor
of the estate of Badger, and when we consider the further
circumstance that Hogle furnished the funds which Badger used in the kiting circuit in which he was engaged,
the equities would seem to be overwhelmingly in favor
of -an innocent, unimplicated customer whose securities
have been converted and the proceeds from the converntain:

sion traceable into Hogle's hands. Lynch subn1its that
as between Hogle and himself, he is entitled to be paid
the proceeds fron1 the sale of his stock which are in
Hogle's possession.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this court should
n•yenw

tit('

judgment of dismissal heretofore entered

hy the trial court and order a reinstatement of plaintiff's

cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,

RA\YLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
D"\VIGHT L. KING
Co11nsel for Plaintiff and
.Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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